Hard tactics and choices: scenarios of Iraq’s political blockage
Translated by Farah El Desouky
So far, all attempts and initiatives by certain Iraqi political forces and national figures to find a way out of Iraq’s current political impasse have failed. Iraq’s internal political situation appears to be in a vicious circle, with the crisis of forming a new government continuing, as does the crisis of selecting a new President of the Republic, in the implementation of constitutional entitlements resulting from the recent elections.
This analysis seeks to determine the dimensions of the current situation in Iraq, the possibilities for resolving the problem of government formation and selection of the new President of the Republic, and how to restore stability within and among the various political blocs and components, which have entered into a state of polarization and attractions that may be unprecedented, as compared to Iraq’s previous elections.
Characteristics of the current political stalemate and its vicious circles:
After all of the attempts to form a government in Iraq, it is clear that this battle has reached a dead end, with no hope of resolution absent significant setbacks and concessions from key political players within the major blocs (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish). The difficulty with these reversals, if they occur, is that they will lead to the dissolution of most of the alliances and political blocs formed as a result of the recent elections. As a result, we can say that success in resolving this quandary is difficult and is governed by several factors, the most important of which are:
(*) The expansion of political polarization within Iraq, as well as the complexity of each polarization’s internal map, making it extremely difficult, even for observers from within Iraq, to understand the movement of these components and read their orientations. For the first time since 2003, we are witnessing a mosaic of different political spectrums gathered under one umbrella in Iraq. With an attempt to change some of the established, even customary, rules of the political game in political practice, particularly the distribution of sovereign positions (Head of Government, Presidency of the Republic, Presidency of Parliament) to Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds, as well as the customary agreement between the two major Kurdish parties regarding the presidency of Kurdistan region and the designation of the President.
(*) For the first time in Iraqi parliamentary history, the problem of “one-third disrupted” has emerged. Although the Sadrist bloc and its coalition with the Sunni component and part of the Kurdish component are majority-owned, they have been unable to pass the formation of the government during three consecutive parliamentary sessions and within the pre-established deadline of the Iraqi Constitution, and has been confirmed by the Federal Supreme Court on more than a dozen occasions.
(*) Clarity on the inability of either of the two main parties in the political equation produced by the recent elections (Sadr’s homeland rescue stream, as well as the Sunni Bloc, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the “coordinating framework” stream, within which most Shi ‘i.e. political components other than the Sadr Stream, namely the Coalition of the State of Law under the leadership of the Norwegian Maliki, and the Alliance of the Conquest of Hadi Al Alawi,
Current strategies and tools for earning money on paper:
The relative latency of the pectoral stream and its provisional optional withdrawal from the battle for government formation, as well as the throwing of the ball in the stadium of forces of the coordinating framework, having announced its 40-day retreat, leaving room for its contents in the Shia House, to form a government without the pectoral block.
(&) The “coordination framework” cluster continues to reject Muqtada al-deadline Sadr’s of 40 days to form a government, believing that this time frame will prolong rather than resolve the crisis.
(&) The emergence of disagreements within the Alliance “Save a Homeland,” which includes the SADC, the Sunni Sovereignty Alliance, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK), particularly between President Mohammed Al-Habbousi and President of Albania. There will be no interference by the chest in preventing or resolving such disputes under the guise of retribution.
(&) During this period, the coordination framework forces attempted to dismantle the equation of current alliances, as they added to the complexity of the landscape, by referring to established rules in political practice during the previous elections, which were known to all inside and outside Iraq, where the coordination framework forces engaged in dialogue with the Kurdistan National Union, the Sunni Resolve Alliance, a number of independent deputies, and the Novem. (The chest stream and the coordination framework) in forming the most numerous parliamentary blocs, and to return to making the positions of Speaker of Parliament and Republic reserved for the Sunni and Kurdish components without interference from another political or parliamentary bloc.
(&) Attempts by coordination framework forces to persuade Al-Sadr to return to the foundations of Iraqi government formation, according to the formula of the larger parliamentary bloc (The Shia bloc), are not in accordance with the concept put forward by Sadr and tried to pass it but failed, which is the concept of the national majority bloc. During these efforts, it was revealed that the frame forces instructed Muqtada Sadr not to object to his candidate for prime minister. Ja ‘afar al-Sadr, but the disagreement revolves around the parliamentary bloc submitting the candidate for prime minister, while the forces of the coordination framework refuse to present the Save the Homeland bloc’s candidate for government presidency.
(&) The Iranians’ attempt to open a Kurdish gap in the Salvation Homeland Alliance’s wall by investing Kurdish boredom from the current state of political obstruction in order to reach understandings between the two large Kurdish parties for the post of President of the Republic based on the possibility of bipartisan agreement to renew their land, or to agree on another candidate who would be named exclusively by the Talabani party.
(&) An Iranian attempt to weaken Muqtada al-position Sadr’s Save a Homeland coalition by leaking information that the chest may go to the opposition. His allies are left without a strong political backbone, which may lead to further divisions. Especially as the forces of the coordination framework continue to bet on the emergence of divisions within the Sunni bloc over the sovereignty alliance between Mohamed Halbusi and Khamis al-Khenger and the Iraqi judiciary’s decision to release prominent Sunni politician Rafah al-Aisawi, it may lead to new polarisation within the Sunni component, and it may be difficult from a mission standpoint.
Options to be expected:
The many complexities of the Iraqi landscape discussed above demonstrate this. and the tactics proposed by various political forces and some external actors influencing Iraq’s interior, including Iran, over the current period That there is a state of political exhaustion that has infected most current political parties, particularly those that won a majority in recent elections and hoped to form a government and implement their party and national agendas.
As a result of previous indicators, we can predict three scenarios for Iraq’s internal landscape:
(*) The first option is to dissolve Parliament and hold new parliamentary elections. This scenario could be implemented through a Federal Supreme Court decision, particularly if the current Parliament fails to implement the required entitlements and complete the various political structures and positions within the pre-established constitutional timelines (which ended on 6 April). This scenario could play out if Muqtada al-Sadr (currently on a 40-day retreat) decides to dissolve Parliament because he was the majority winner in the last elections.
(*) Second scenario: Sadr’s withdrawal from the battle for the formation of the Government and transition to the opposition seat, with a view to throwing the ball into the stadium of Shia forces that rejected his role, disrupted the formation of the Government, and named the President of the Republic, and possibly betting Sadr on the Iraqi street, which has already rejected some of the current political facets that control the scene, particularly within the forces allied with the Islamic State.
(*) Scenario III: The passage of the new government in accordance with new understandings. The emergence of this scenario is predicated first on a decision by the Federal Court to give political forces a second chance to form a government. Its success is linked to the extent to which Al-Sadr wishes to maintain the formation of a government and not respond to any attempts from the coordination framework to dissuade him, while maintaining the cohesion of his alliance (saving a homeland), while betting on independent deputies and blocks.
(*) Scenario IV: The business situation will persist until the problem is resolved: or business facilitation status, implying that the country has re-entered a political vacuum.
It is recognized that the current political situation in Iraq remains open to several scenarios, creating uncertainty and concern, particularly for states with interests in Iraq or those betting on Iraq’s stability and return as a powerful regional force. The gravity of this political stalemate extends beyond Iraq’s internal situation. The Iraqi political situation is heading in the same direction as Lebanon’s political situation, which could lead to an internal explosion and a resurgence of demonstrations. Externally, Iraq’s survival in the absence of a new government, as well as the placement of business facilitation in the positions of Head of Government and President of the Republic, meant that any regional cooperation projects would be disrupted during this period. s regional role and provided Iraq with a positive perspective for neighboring States and some international forces.